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The partial information decomposition (PID) is a promising framework for decomposing a joint
random variable into the amount of influence each source variable Xi has on a target variable Y ,
relative to the other sources. For two sources, influence breaks down into the information that
both X0 and X1 redundantly share with Y , what X0 uniquely shares with Y , what X1 uniquely
shares with Y , and finally what X0 and X1 synergistically share with Y . Unfortunately, considerable
disagreement has arisen as to how these four components should be quantified. Drawing from
cryptography, we consider the secret key agreement rate as an operational method of quantifying
unique informations. Secret key agreement rate comes in several forms, depending upon which parties
are permitted to communicate. We demonstrate that three of these four forms are inconsistent with
the PID. The remaining form implies certain interpretations as to the PID’s meaning—interpretations
not present in PID’s definition but that, we argue, need to be explicit. These reveal an inconsistency
between third-order connected information, two-way secret key agreement rate, and synergy. Similar
difficulties arise with a popular PID measure in light the results here as well as from a maximum
entropy viewpoint. We close by reviewing the challenges facing the PID.
PACS numbers: 05.45.-a 89.75.Kd 89.70.+c 02.50.-r
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a joint distribution over “source” variables X0
and X1 and “target” Y . Such distributions arise in many
settings: sensory integration, logical computing, neural
coding, functional network inference, and many others.
One promising approach to understanding how the in-
formation shared between (X0, X1), and Y is organized
is the partial information decomposition (PID) [1]. This
decomposition seeks to quantify how much of the informa-
tion shared between X0, X1, and Y is done so redundantly,
how much is uniquely attributable to X0, how much is
uniquely attributable to X1, and finally how much arises
synergistically by considering both X0 and X1 together.
Unfortunately, the lack of a commonly accepted method
of quantifying these components has hindered PID’s adop-
tion. In point of fact, several proposed axioms are not
mutually consistent [2, 3]. And, to date, there is little
agreement as to which should hold. Here, we take a
step toward understanding these issues by adopting an
operational definition for the unique information. This
operational definition comes from information-theoretic
cryptography and quantifies the rate at which two parties
can construct a secret while a third party eavesdrops.
There are four varieties of secret key agreement rate de-
pending on which parties are allowed to communicate,
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each of which defines a different PID. Each variety also
relates to a different intuition as to how the PID operates.
We discuss several aspects of these different methods and
further demonstrate that three of the four fail to construct
an internally consistent decomposition.
Our development proceeds as follows. Section II briefly
describes the two-source PID. Section III reviews the no-
tion of secret key agreement rate and how to quantify
it in three contexts: No one communicates, only Alice
communicates, and both Alice and Bob communicate.
Section IV discusses the behavior of the PID quantified
utilizing secret key agreement rates as unique informa-
tions and what intuitions are implied by the choice of
who is permitted to communicate. Section V explores
two further implications of our primary results, first in a
distribution where two-way communication seems to cap-
ture synergistic, third-order connected information and
second in the behavior of an extant method of quantifying
the PID along with maximum entropy methods. Finally,
Section VI summarizes our findings and speculates about
PID’s future.
II. PARTIAL INFORMATION
DECOMPOSITION
Two-source PID seeks to decompose the mutual informa-
tion I[X0X1 : Y ] between “sources” X0 and X1 and a
“target” Y into four nonnegative components. The com-
ponents identify information that is redundant, uniquely
associated with X0, uniquely associated with X1, and
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2synergistic:
I[X0X1 : Y ] = I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] redundant
+ I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] unique with X0
+ I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] unique with X1
+ I∂ [X0X1 → Y ] . synergistic
(1)
Furthermore, the mutual information I[X0 : Y ] between
X0 and Y is decomposed into two components:
I[X0 : Y ] = I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] redundant
+ I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] . unique with X0 (2)
And, similarly:
I[X1 : Y ] = I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] redundant
+ I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] . unique with X1 (3)
In this way, PID relates the four component informations.
However, since Eqs. (1) to (3) provide only three indepen-
dent constraints for four quantities, it does not uniquely
determine how to quantify them in general. That is, this
fourth constraint lies outside of the PID.
By the same logic, though, the decomposition is uniquely
determined by quantifying exactly one of its constituents.
In the case that one wishes to directly quantify the unique
informations I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] and I∂ [X1 → Y \X0]
, a consistency relation must hold so that they do not
overconstrain the decomposition:
I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] + I[X1 : Y ]
= I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] + I[X0 : Y ] . (4)
This ensures that using either Eq. (2) or Eq. (3) results
in the same quantification of I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] .
III. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT
Secret key agreement is a fundamental concept within
information-theoretic cryptography [4]. Consider three
parties—Alice, Bob, and Eve—who each partially observe
a source of common randomness, joint probability distri-
bution ABE ∼ p(a, b, e), where Alice has access only to a,
Bob b, and Eve e. The central challenge is to determine
if it is possible for Alice and Bob to agree upon a secret
key of which Eve has no knowledge. The degree to which
they may generate such a secret key immediately depends
upon the structure of the joint distribution ABE. It
also depends upon whether Alice and Bob are allowed to
publicly communicate.
Concretely, consider Alice, Bob, and Eve each receiving n
independent, identically distributed samples from ABE—
Alice receiving An, Bob Bn, and Eve En. A secret key
agreement scheme consists of functions f and g, as well as
a protocol (h) for public communication allowing either
Alice, Bob, neither, or both to communicate. In the case
of a single party being permitted to communicate—say,
Alice—she constructs C = h(An) and then broadcasts
it to all parties. In the case that both parties are per-
mitted communication, they take turns constructing and
broadcasting messages of the form Ci = hi(An, C[0...i−1])
(Alice) and Ci = hi(Bn, C[0...i−1]) (Bob) [5].
Formally, a secret key agreement scheme is considered
R-achievable if for all  > 0:
KA
(1)= f(An, C) ,
KB
(2)= g(Bn, C) ,
p(KA = KB = K)
(3)
≥ 1−  ,
I[K : CEn]
(4)
≤  , and
1
n
H[K]
(5)
≥ R−  ,
where (1) and (2) denote the method by which Alice and
Bob construct their keys KA and KB, respectively, (3)
states that their keys must agree with arbitrarily high
probability, (4) states that the information about the key
which Eve—armed with both her private information En
as well as the public communication C—has access to be
arbitrarily small, and (5) states that the key consists of
approximately R bits per sample.
The greatest rate R such that an achievable scheme exists
is known as the secret key agreement rate. Notational
variations indicate which parties are permitted to commu-
nicate. In the case that Alice and Bob are not allowed to
communicate, their rate of secret key agreement is denoted
S(A : B || E). When only Alice is allowed to communi-
cate their secret key agreement rate is S(A→ B || E) or,
equivalently, S(B ← A || E). When both Alice and Bob
are allowed to communicate, their secret key agreement
rate is denoted S(A ↔ B || E). In this, we modified
the standard notation for secret key agreement rates to
emphasize which party or parties communicate.
In the case of no communication, S(A : B || E) is given
by [6]:
S(A : B || E) = H[AupriseB|E] , (5)
where X uprise Y denotes the Gács-Körner common random
variable [7]. It is worth noting that this quantity does not
vary continuously with the distribution and generically
vanishes.
3In the case of one-way communication, S(A→ B || E) is
given by [8]:
S(A→ B || E) = max {I[B : K|C]− I[E : K|C]} , (6)
where the maximum is taken over all variables C and
K, such that the following Markov condition holds:
C−◦−K−◦−A−◦−BE. It suffices to consider K and C
such that |K| ≤ |A| and |C| ≤ |A|2.
There is no such solution for S(A↔ B || E); however, var-
ious upper- and lower-bounds are known [5]. One simple
lower bound is the supremum of the two one-way secret
key agreement rates, as they are both a subset of bidi-
rectional communication. An even simpler upper bound
that we will use is the intrinsic mutual information [9]:
I[A : B ↓ E] = min
p(e|e)
I
[
A : B|E] . (7)
This effectively states that any information Eve has access
to through any local modification of her observations
cannot be secret.
The unique PID component I∂ [X0 \X1 → Y ] could be
assigned the value of a secret key agreement rate under
four different schemes. First, neither X0 nor Y may be
allowed to communicate. Second, only X0 can communi-
cate. Third, only Y is permitted to communicate. Finally,
both X0 and Y may be allowed to communicate. Note
that the eavesdropper X1 is not allowed to communicate
in any secret sharing schemes here.
Secret key agreement rates have been associated with
unique informations before. One particular upper bound
on S(A ↔ B || E)—the intrinsic mutual informa-
tion Eq. (7)—is known to not satisfy the consistency
condition Eq. (4) [10]. More recently, the relationship be-
tween a particular method of quantifying unique informa-
tion and one-way secret key agreement S(X0 ← Y || X1)
has been considered [11].
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PARTIAL
INFORMATION DECOMPOSITIONS
We now address the application of each form of secret key
agreement rate as unique information in turn. For each
resulting PID, we consider two distributions. The first is
that called Pointwise Unique, chosen here to exemplify
the differing intuitions that can be applied to the PID.
The second distribution we look at is entitled Problem
as it serves as a counterexample demonstrating that three
of the four forms of secret key agreement do not result in
a consistent decomposition. Both distributions are given
in Fig. 1.
Pnt. Unq.
X0 X1 Y Pr
0 1 1 1/4
1 0 1 1/4
0 2 2 1/4
2 0 2 1/4
Problem
X0 X1 Y Pr
0 0 0 1/4
0 1 1 1/4
0 2 0 1/4
1 0 1 1/4
FIG. 1. Two distributions of interest: The first, Pointwise
Unique, exemplifies the directionality inherent in the one-way
secret key agreement rates. The second, Problem, demonstrates
that the no-communication, one-way communication with the
source communicating (“camel”), and the two-way communi-
cation secret key agreement rates result in inconsistent PIDs.
Interpreting the Pointwise Unique [12] distribution is
relatively straightforward. The target Y takes on the
values ‘1’ and ‘2’ with equal probability. At the same
time, exactly one of the two sources (again with equal
probability) will be equal to Y , while the other is ‘0’. The
mutual informations I[X0 : Y ] = 1/2bit and I[X1 : Y ] =
1/2bit.
The Problem distribution lacks the symmetry of Point-
wise Unique, yet still consists of four equally probable
events. The sources are restricted to take on pairs ‘00’,
‘01’, ‘02’, ‘10’. The target Y is equal to a ‘1’ if either
X0 or X1 is ‘1’, and is ‘0’ otherwise. With this distribu-
tion, the mutual informations I[X0 : Y ] = 0.3113 bit and
I[X1 : Y ] = 1/2 bit.
A. No Public Communication
In the first case, we consider the unique information from
Xi to Y as the rate at which Xi and Y can agree upon
a secret key while exchanging no public communication:
I∂ [Xi \Xj → Y ] = S(Xi : Y || Xj). This approach has
some appeal: the PID is defined simply by a joint distri-
bution without any express allowance or prohibition on
public communication. However, given its quantification
in terms of the Gács-Körner common information, the
quantity S(Xi : Y || Xj) does not vary continuously with
the distribution of interest. Now, what is the behavior of
this measure on our two distributions of interest?
When applied to Pointwise Unique, each source and
the target are unable to construct a secret key. In turn,
each unique information is determined to be 0 bit. This
results in a redundancy and a synergy each of 1/2 bit.
The Problem distribution demonstrates the inability of
S(Xi : Y || Xj) to construct a consistent PID. In this
instance, as in the case of Pointwise Unique, no secrecy
is possible and each unique information is assigned a value
of 0 bit. We therefore determine from Eq. (2) that the
4S(Xi : Y || Xj)
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. I∂ [X0X1 → Y ] 1/2 bit
I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] 0 bit
I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] 0 bit
I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] 1/2 bit
P
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I∂ [X0X1 → Y ] 7
I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] 0 bit
I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] 0 bit
I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] 7
TABLE I. Partial information decompositions of Point-
wise Unique and Problem when quantified using no-
communication secret key agreement rate. Pointwise Unique
decomposes into 0 bit for either unique information and into
1/2 bit for both the redundancy and synergy. Problem’s re-
dundancy and synergy cannot be quantified, since the two
secret key agreement rates result in different quantifications.
redundancy should be I[X0 : Y ] − I∂ [X0 \X1 → Y ] =
0.3113 bit − 0 bit = 0.3113 bit. Equation (3), however,
says the redundancy is I[X1 : Y ] − I∂ [X1 \X0 → Y ] =
1/2bit− 0 bit = 1/2 bit. This contradiction demonstrates
that no-communication secret key agreement rate cannot
be used as a PID’s unique components.
The resulting partial information decompositions for both
distributions are listed in Table I.
B. One-Way Public Communication
We next consider the situation when one of the two par-
ties is allowed public communication. This gives us two
options: either the source Xi communicates to target
Y or vice versa. Both situations enshrine a particular
directionality in the resulting PID.
The first, where Xi constructs C = h(Xni ) and publicly
communicates it, emphasizes the channels Xi → Y and
creates a narrative of the sources conspiring to create the
target. We call this interpretation the camel intuition,
after the aphorism that a camel is a horse designed by
committee. The committee member Xi may announce
what design constraints they brought to the table.
The second option, where Y constructs C = h(Y n) and
publicly communicates it, emphasizes the channels Y →
Xi and implies the situation that the sources are imperfect
representations of the target. We call this interpretation
the elephant intuition, as it recalls the parable of the
blind men describing an elephant for the first time. The
elephant Y may announce which of its features is revealed
in a particular instance.
S(Xi → Y || Xj)
P
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. I∂ [X0X1 → Y ] 0 bit
I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] 1/2 bit
I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] 1/2 bit
I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] 0 bit
P
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I∂ [X0X1 → Y ] 7
I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] 0 bit
I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] 1/2 bit
I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] 7
TABLE II. Partial information decompositions of Pointwise
Unique and Problem when quantified using one-way commu-
nication secret key agreement rate with the source permitted
public communication: Pointwise Unique decomposes into
1/2 bit for either unique information and into 0 bit for both the
redundancy and synergy. Problem’s redundancy and synergy
cannot be quantified.
1. Camels
The first option adopts I∂ [Xi \Xj → Y ] = S(Xi →
Y || Xj), bringing to mind the idea of sources acting
as inputs into some scheme by which the target is pro-
duced. When viewed this way, one may ask questions such
as “How much information in X0 is uniquely conveyed to
Y ?”. Furthermore, the channels X0 → Y and X1 → Y
take center stage.
Through this lens, the Pointwise Unique distribution
has a clear interpretation. Given any realization, exactly
one source is perfectly correlated with the target, while
the other is impotently ‘0’. From this vantage, it is clear
that the unique informations should each be 1/2 bit, and
this is borne out with the one-way secret key agreement
rate. This implies that the redundancy and synergy of
this decomposition are both 0 bit.
For the Problem distribution, we find that X1 can broad-
cast the times when they observed a ‘1’ or a ‘2’, which
correspond to Y having observed a ‘1’ or ‘0’, respectively.
In both instances X0 observed a ‘0’ and so cannot de-
duce what the other two have agreed upon. This leads
to S(X1 → Y || X0) being equal to 1/2 bit. At the same
time, S(X0 → Y || X1) vanishes. However, Problem’s
redundancy and synergy cannot be quantified, since the
two secret key agreement schemes imply different redun-
dancies and so are inconsistent with Eq. (4).
The resulting PIDs for both are given in Table II.
2. Elephants
When the target Y is the one party permitted communi-
cation, one adopts I∂ [Xi \Xj → Y ] = S(Xi ← Y || Xj)
and we can interpret the sources as alternate views of
5S(Xi ← Y || Xj)
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. I∂ [X0X1 → Y ] 1/2 bit
I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] 0 bit
I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] 0 bit
I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] 1/2 bit
P
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I∂ [X0X1 → Y ] 1/2 bit
I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] 0 bit
I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] 0.1887 bit
I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] 0.3113 bit
TABLE III. PID for Pointwise Unique and Problem when
quantified using one-way communication secret key agreement
rate with the target permitted public communication: Point-
wise Unique decomposes into 1/2 bit for either unique infor-
mation, and into 0 bit for both the redundancy and synergy.
Problem admits unique informations of 0 bit and 0.1887 bit,
respectively. This results in a redundancy of 0.3113 bit and a
synergy of 1/2 bit, providing a consistent PID.
the singular target. Consider, for example, journalism
where several sources give differing perspectives on the
same event. When viewed this way, one might ask a
question such as “How much information in Y is uniquely
captured by X0?”. The channels X0 ← Y and X1 ← Y
are paramount with this approach. We denote these in
reverse to emphasize that Y is still the target in the PID.
Considered this way, the Pointwise Unique distribution
takes on a different character. The sources each receive
identical descriptions of the target—accurate half the time
and erased the remainder. The description is identical,
however. Nothing is uniquely provided to either source.
This is reflected in the secret key agreement rates, which
are 0 bit, leaving both the redundancy and synergy 1/2 bit.
The Problem distribution’s unique informations are
S(X0 ← Y || X1) = 0 bit and S(X1 ← Y || X0) =
0.1887 bit. Unlike the prior two decompositions, these
unique informations satisfy Eq. (4). The resulting redun-
dancy is 0.3113 bit while the synergy is 1/2 bit.
Their PIDs are listed in Table III. Thus, by having Y
publicly communicate and so invoking a particular direc-
tionality we, finally, get a consistent PID.
C. Two-Way Public Communication
We finally turn to the full two-way secret key agree-
ment rate: I∂ [Xi \Xj → Y ] = S(Xi ↔ Y || Xj). This
approach is also appealing, as it does not ascribe any
directionality to interpreting the PID. Furthermore, it
varies continuously with the distribution, unlike the no-
communication case. However, this quantity is generally
impossible to compute directly, with only upper and lower
bounds known. Fortunately, this only slightly complicates
the analyses we wish to make.
S(Xi ↔ Y || Xj)
P
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. I∂ [X0X1 → Y ] 0 bit
I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] 1/2 bit
I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] 1/2 bit
I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] 0 bit
P
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I∂ [X0X1 → Y ] 7
I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] ≤ 0.1887 bit
I∂ [X1 → Y \X0] 1/2 bit
I∂ [X0 ·X1 → Y ] 7
TABLE IV. PID for Pointwise Unique and Problem when
quantified using two-way communication secret key agreement
rate: Pointwise Unique decomposes into 1/2 bit for either
unique information, and into 0 bit for both the redundancy
and synergy. Problem’s redundancy and synergy cannot be
quantified, because the two secret key agreement rates result
in different quantifications.
In the case of the Pointwise Unique distribution, it is
not possible to extract more secret information than was
done in the camel situation. Therefore, the resulting PID
is identical: unique informations of 1/2 bit and redundancy
and synergy of 0 bit.
Problem, however, is again a problem. Upper and lower
bounds on S(X1 ↔ Y || X0) converge1 to 1/2 bit, and
so we know this value exactly. Utilizing the consistency
relation Eq. (4), we find that the other unique information
must be 0.3113 bit in order for the full decomposition to
be consistent. However, the intrinsic mutual information
places an upper bound of 0.1887 bit on S(X0 ↔ Y || X1).
We therefore must conclude that two-way secret key agree-
ment rates cannot be used to directly quantify unique
information and a consistent PID cannot be built using
them.
The resulting PIDs for both these distributions can be
seen in Table IV.
D. Summary
To conclude, then, there is only one secret-key communi-
cation scenario—Y publicly communicates—that yields a
consistent PID, as in Table III. While we have not proven
this, we have been unable to find a counterexample after
extensive numerical searches using the dit [13] software
package. That is, one must invoke a directionality, un-
specified by the PID, to have a consistent PID if using
secret key agreement as the basis for the PID component
of unique information.
1 In this instance, the larger of the two one-way secret key agreement
rates form a lower bound of 1/2 bit. While the upper bound
provided by the intrinsic mutual information is also 1/2 bit.
6V. DISCUSSION
We now turn to two follow-on developments arising from
the tools developed thus far. First, we define a distribu-
tion whose two-way secret key agreement rates behave
in a curious manner with very interesting implications
regarding the nature of information itself. Second, we
take a closer look at an alternative proposal for quan-
tifying unique information and describe its behavior in
relationship to the camel/elephant dichotomy defined in
Section IV.
A. When Conversation is More Powerful Than a
Lecture
We now explore the PID quantified by two-way secret key
agreement further. Consider the Giant Bit distribution,
which exemplifies redundant information. The distribu-
tion G.B. Erased, resulting from passing each variable
through an independent binary erasure channel (BEC),
exhibits many interesting properties. It is listed in Fig. 2.
Most notably, the one-way secret key agreement rates
between any two variables with the third eavesdropping
vanish. However, the two-way secret key agreement rate
is equal to pp2 = I[Xi : Y |Xj ] [14]. Furthermore, notice
that subtracting Eq. (3) from Eq. (1) tells us that:
I[X0X1 : Y ]− I[X1 : Y ]
= I[X0 : Y |X1]
= I∂ [X0 → Y \X1] + I∂ [X0X1 → Y ] . (8)
That is, the conditional mutual information is equal to
unique information plus synergistic information.
Evaluating the PID using S(Xi ↔ Y ||Xj) as unique infor-
mation results, in this case, in a consistent decomposition.
Furthermore, the redundant and synergistic informations
are zero. This is, however, troublesome: G.B. Erased
possesses nonzero third-order connected information [15],
a quantity commonly considered a component of the syn-
ergy [16]. Indeed, it is provably attributed to synergy by
both the Idep [16] and IBROJA [17] methods, and likely
others as well. No other proposed method of quantifying
the PID results in zero redundancy or synergy. The im-
plication here is that, if indeed the third-order connected
information is a component of synergy, the two-way secret
key agreement rate overestimates unique information by
including some types of synergistic effect. Therefore, we
conclude that bidirectional communication between two
parties can, in some instances, determine information held
solely in trivariate interactions. It remains to be under-
stood (i) how independently and identically transforming
Giant Bit
X0 X1 Y Pr
0 0 0 1/2
1 1 1 1/2
G.B. Erased
X0 X1 Y Pr
0 0 0 p3/2
0 0 Ô pp2/2
0 Ô 0 pp2/2
0 Ô Ô p2p/2
1 1 1 p3/2
1 1 Ô pp2/2
1 Ô 1 pp2/2
1 Ô Ô p2p/2
Ô 0 0 pp2/2
Ô 0 Ô p2p/2
Ô 1 1 pp2/2
Ô 1 Ô p2p/2
Ô Ô 0 p2p/2
Ô Ô 1 p2p/2
Ô Ô Ô p3
BEC(p)
0
1
0
Ô
1
p
p
p
p
FIG. 2. Distribution whose one-way secret key agreement
rates are all 0 bit, yet has nonzero two-way secret key agree-
ment rate. It is constructed from the Giant Bit distribu-
tion by passing each variable independently through a binary
erasure channel BEC(p) with erasure probability p. This
distribution has a two-way secret key agreement rate of pp2
between any two variables with the third as an eavesdropper.
a distribution with no third-order connected information
can result in its creation and (ii) how only two of the
variables can recover it when allowed to communicate.
B. IBROJA , the Elephant
The measure of Bertschinger et al. [17], here referred to
as IBROJA, is perhaps the most widely accepted and used
method of quantifying the PID. Though popular, it has
its detractors [12, 18]. Here, we interpret the criticisms
leveled and IBROJA as a product of camel intuitions
being applied to an elephantesque [11] measure. In doing
so, we will primarily consider the Pointwise Unique
distribution.
As noted in Section IVB, if a source is permitted to com-
municate with the target, then a secret key agreement
rate of 1/2 bit is achievable; while if the target communi-
cates with the source then it is impossible to agree upon
a secret key. From this camel perspective it is clear that
each source, half the time, uniquely determines the tar-
get. The elephant perspective, however, allots nothing
to unique informations as each source is provided with
identical information. This would greatly disconcert the
camel and may lead one to think that the elephant has
“artificially inflated” the redundancy. We next take a
closer look at this notion, using IBROJA.
7In the course of computing IBROJA for the distribution
p(X0, X1, Y ), the set of distributions:
Q = {q(X0, X1, Y ) : ∀i, q(Xi, Y ) = p(Xi, Y )}
is considered. The (∗) assumption [17] is then invoked,
which states that redundancy and all unique informations
are constant within this family of distributions. To com-
plete the quantification, the distribution with minimum
I[X0X1 : Y ] is selected from this family. The resulting
distribution associated with the Pointwise Unique dis-
tribution can be seen in Fig. 3. Made explicit, it can now
be seen that IBROJA does indeed correlate the sources, but
under assumption (∗) this does not effect the redundancy.
One aspect of IBROJA and assumption (∗) we believe
warrants further investigation is its relationship with max-
imum entropy philosophy [19]. The latter is, in effect,
Occam’s razor applied to probability distributions: given
a set of constraints, the most natural distribution to as-
sociate with them is that with maximum entropy. As
it turns out, this is equivalent to the distribution near-
est the unstructured product-of-marginals distribution
p(x, y, z, . . .) = p(x)p(y)p(z) . . . [20]:
argmax
q∈Q
H[q] = argmin
q∈Q
DKL [q || p] ,
where DKL [P || P ] is the relative entropy between distri-
butions P and Q. Having briefly introduced the ideas
behind maximum entropy, we next cast their light on the
BROJA optimization employed to calculate IBROJA.
Let us first consider the distribution resulting from
BROJA optimization. Its entropy is unchanged from the
Pointwise Unique distribution indicating that it has
the same amount of structure—they are equally distant
from the product distribution. The BROJA distribution
has a reduced I[X0X1 : Y ] mutual information, how-
ever, indicating perhaps that the optimization has shifted
some of the distribution’s structure away from the sources-
target interaction. It is interesting that this optimization
could not simply remove the synergy from the distribution
altogether, resulting in a larger entropy.
If one takes assumption (∗) and directly applies the max-
imum entropy philosophy, a different distribution results.
This distribution, seen in Fig. 3, has a larger entropy
than both the Pointwise Unique and the BROJA in-
termediate distribution, indicating that it in fact has less
structure than either. Under assumption (∗), the Max-
Ent distribution, also in Fig. 3, retains all the redundant
and unique informations, while under maximum entropy
it contains no structure not implied by the source-target
marginals—e.g., no synergy.
To be clear, this is not to claim that assumption (∗) or
BROJA optimization are wrong or incorrect, only that the
a) BROJA
X0 X1 Y Pr
0 0 1 1/4
0 0 2 1/4
1 1 1 1/4
2 2 2 1/4
b) MaxEnt
X0 X1 Y Pr
0 0 1 1/8
0 0 2 1/8
0 1 1 1/8
0 2 2 1/8
1 0 1 1/8
1 1 1 1/8
2 0 1 1/8
2 2 2 1/8
FIG. 3. Two modified forms of the Pointwise Unique
distribution. a) Intermediate distribution resulting from the
BROJA optimization. It has the minimum sources-target mu-
tual information consistent with the source-target marginals.
b) Maximum entropy distribution consistent with the source-
target marginals. It contains no structure beyond that implied
by those marginals.
optimization’s behavior in light of well-established maxi-
mum entropy principles is subtle and requires a careful
investigation. For example, it may be that the source-
target marginals do imply some level of triadic interaction
and therefore the maximum entropy distribution reflects
this lingering synergy. At the same time, BROJA min-
imization may be capable of maintaining that level of
structure implied by the marginals, but somehow shunts
it into H[Y |X0X1] .
VI. CONCLUSION
At present, a primary barrier for PID’s general adop-
tion as a useful and possibly a central tool in analyzing
how complex systems store and process information is
an agreement on a method to quantify its component
informations. Here, we posited that one reason for dis-
agreement stems from conflicting intuitions regarding the
decomposition’s operational behavior. To give an opera-
tional meaning to unique information and address these
intuitions, we equated unique information with the abil-
ity of two parties to agree upon a secret. This leads to
numerous observations.
The first is that the PID, as currently defined, is am-
bivalent to any notion of directionality. There are, how-
ever, very clear cases in which the assumption of a
directionality—or lack there of—is critical to the exis-
tence of unique information. Consider, for example, the
case of the McGurk effect [21] where the visual stimulus
of one phoneme and the auditory stimulus of another
phoneme gives rise to the perception of a third phoneme.
By construction, the stimuli cause the perception, and the
channels implicit in a camel intuition are central. If one
8were to study this interaction using an elephant-like PID,
it is unclear that the resulting decomposition would reflect
the neurobiological mechanisms by which the perception
is produced. Similarly, a camel-like measure would be
inappropriate when interpreting simultaneous PET and
MRI scans of a tumor.
One can view this as the PID being inherently context-
dependent and conclude that quantification requires spec-
ifying directionality. In this case, the elephant intuition
is apparently more natural, as adopting closely-related
notions from cryptography results in a consistent PID. If
context demands the camel intuition, though, either a non-
cryptographic method of quantifying unique information
is needed or consistency must be enforced by augmenting
the secret key agreement rate. It is additionally possible
that associating secret key agreement rates with unique
information is fundamentally flawed and that, ultimately,
PID entails quantifying unique information as something
distinct from the ability to agree upon a secret key. This
missing thing has yet to be identified.
The next observation concerns the third-order connected
information. We first demonstrated that such triadic in-
formation can be constructed from common information
from which each variable is then independently and iden-
tically modified. Furthermore, it has been shown that two
of those three parties, when engaging in bidirectional com-
munication, can capture this triadic information. This
does not generically occur: For example, if X0 X1 Y are
related by Xor, the distribution contains 1 bit of third-
order connected information, but S(X0 ↔ Y || X1) (or
any permutation of the variables) is equal to 0 bit. This
suggests that the third-order connected information may
not be an atomic quantity, but rather consists of two
parts, one accessible to two communicating parties and
one not.
Our third observation regards the behavior of the IBROJA
measure, especially in relation to standard maximum
entropy principles. We first demonstrated that IBROJA
indeed correlates sources, but argued that this behavior
only seems inappropriate when adopting a camel intuition.
We then discussed how its intermediate distribution is as
structured as the initial one and so if indeed IBROJA is
operating correctly, it must shuffle the dependencies that
result in synergy to another aspect of the distribution.
Finally, we discussed how the standard maximum entropy
approach may remove synergy from a distribution all
together. This calls for a more careful investigation as to
whether it does—and BROJA optimization is incorrect—
or does not—and synergistic information is implied under
source-target marginals and Occam’s razor.
Looking to the future, we trust that this exploration of the
relationship between cryptographic secrecy and unique
information will provide a basis for future efforts to under-
stand and quantify the partial information decomposition.
Furthermore, the explicit recognition of the role that di-
rectional intuitions play in the meaning and interpretation
of a decomposition should reduce cross-talk and improve
understanding as we collectively move forward.
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